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Abstract
We present a prospect theory model to explain why power transitions do
not necessarily lead to war. We nd that three major mechanisms prevent
the occurrence of potential power transition wars. First, the dual boiling frog
eects occurring in the middle range of capability catching-up rate prevent a
dominant state from preempting and a rising state from challenging the other
side. Second, divergent expectations for favorable comparative growth advan-
tage motivate both parties to keep the status quo. Third, the concerns of rela-
tive advantage deterioration over a third party in the post-war power structure
help deter both parties from starting a war.
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1 Introduction
Since Organski (1958) rst introduced the power transition theory, it has been be-
lieved by many students in international politics that power transitions cause general
wars. Intuitively, when a rising state appears to surpass the dominant state in ca-
pabilities, the rising state would have incentive to take over the dominant state's
leadership while the dominant state would have incentive to preempt the former from
doing so. Therefore, war is logically inevitable. However, historically many if not
more power transitions did not lead to war (Houweling and Siccama 1988).
Then, why power transitions do not imply war? Kim and Morrow (1992) raise
a choice-theoretic model of war decisions during power shifts to explain that the
willingness to take risks plays a central role. However, the measurement of risk
acceptance of a state is rather dicult and quite possibly inaccurate.
We provide a prospect theory model for a more objective and reliable explanation.
We nd that three major mechanisms prevent the occurrence of potential power
transition wars. First, the dual boiling frog eects occurring in the middle range of
capability catching-up rate prevent a dominant state from preempting and a rising
state from challenging the other side. Second, divergent expectations for favorable
comparative growth advantage motivate both parties to keep the status quo. Third,
the concerns of relative advantage deterioration over a third party in the post-war
power structure deter even the expected winner from starting a war.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a dyadic model
of power transition war and characterizes the equilibrium of the game. Section 3,
Section 4, and Section 5 analyze how the dual boiling frog eects, the eects of
expectation divergence, and the concerns of relative advantage deterioration over a
third party help to prevent potential power transition wars respectively. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
There exist a hegemon (dominant state) and a potential challenger (rising state).
The potential challenger appears to be surpassing the hegemon in capabilities. Time
is discrete, indexed by t, and the horizon is innite and common discount factor
 2 (0; 1). The capabilities of the hegemon is normalized to one. The capabilities of
the potential challenger at period t is denoted by yt, which is growing over time. At
each period, the potential challenger must decide whether to challenge the hegemon
or to keep the status quo while the hegemon must decide whether to preempt the
potential challenger or to keep the status quo. If the potential challenger chooses to
challenge, the hegemon must choose to either resist or capitulate. If the hegemon
choose to preempt, the potential challenger must choose to either resist or capitulate.
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2.1 Stage Game
Consider the stage game in period t, if both the hegemon and potential challenger
keep the status quo, the hegemon enjoys the hegemonic bonus, which is normalized to
one, while the potential challenger gets the benet share of the follower, 1=2 > s > 0.
If the potential hegemon preempts, the potential challenger must decide whether
to resist or capitulate. If the potential challenger resists, war begins. The winner will
be the single hegemony and enjoy the periodic hegemonic bonus, whereas the loser is
out of the game and gets zero thereafter. Instead, if the potential challenger capitu-
lates, the hegemon becomes the single hegemon without war, whereas the potential
challenger is out of the game.
If the potential challenger challenges, the hegemon must decide whether to
resist or capitulate. If the hegemon resists, war begins. The winner will be
the single hegemony and enjoy the periodic hegemonic bonus, whereas the loser
is out of the game. If the hegemon capitulates, we have the peaceful power
transit, after which the hegemon and the potential challenger exchange their
seats. Therefore, the action sets of the potential challenger and the hegemon
are A1 = fS(tatus quo); C(hallenging); R(esisting); Ca(pitulating)g and A2 =
fS(tatus quo); P (reempting); R(esisting); Ca(pitulating)g respectively. The timing
and the stage game payos in period t are shown in table 1.1
Table 1: Timing and the Stage Game Payos in Period t
Outcomes
Payos for the Po-
tential Challenger
and Hegemon
Both keeping the Status Quo (S) Status Quo (s; 1)
Hegemon
preempting
(P)
Potential Challenger
resisting (R)
War (p(yt); 1  p(yt))
Potential Challenger
capitulating (Ca)
Single Hegemony (0; 1)
Potential
Challenger
challenging
(C)
Hegemon resisting
(R)
War (p(yt); 1  p(yt))
Hegemon capitulating
(Ca)
Peaceful Transit (1; s)
Here, the chance of winning a war depends on the relative capabilities of the
hegemon and the potential challenger. Specically, if there is a war at period t, given
1Who moves rst in the stage game does not matter. If one keeps status quo, the other has
the option of keeping status quo or challenging (preempting). In the latter case, the opponent then
decide whether to resist or capitulate.
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the capabilities of the potential challenger yt, the winning probability for the potential
challenger is p(yt), which is an increasing function of yt. yt is growing at rate gt > 0
in period t, i.e., yt+1 = (1 + gt)yt. We assume that there exists some \fuzzy area"
(y; y), such that only if yt is greater than the lower bound y, is there a positive chance
for the potential challenger to win the war; if yt is greater than or equal to the upper
bound y, the chance for the potential challenger to win the war equals one. Further,
we assume that there exists some ey 2 (y; y) with p(ey)  1=2, such that (1 + gt) > 1
for yt+1 = (1 + gt)yt  ey and (1 + gt)  1 for yt+1 = (1 + gt)yt > ey. That is to say,ey is the turning point of the growth of the capabilities of the potential challenger.
This captures the idea that if yt+1 = (1 + gt)yt  ey, the potential challenger is in the
stage of \taking-o" with higher growth rate gt > 1=   1; if yt+1 = (1 + gt)yt > ey,
the potential challenger is in the stage of \surpassing" with lower growth rate gt 
1= 1.2 In addition, if yt 2 (y; ey), p0 > 0 and p00 > 0; if yt 2 (ey; y), p0 > 0 and p00 < 0.
This says that if yt is in the \taking-o" stage, the winning function of the potential
challenger p(yt) is convex, whereas if yt is in the \surpassing" stage, p(yt) is concave.
The winning function of the potential challenger p(yt) is illustrated in gure 1.
 
 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Winning Probability of the Potential Challenger in a War
In addition, we assume the winner suers the capabilities loss due to the war, which
is an increasing function of the opponent's capabilities. That is, if the hegemony wins
the war in period t, its capabilities will be reduced by the amount D(yt), whereas if
the potential challenger wins the war in period t, its capabilities will be reduced by
the amount D(1=yt), where D
0 > 0 and D00 > 0.
2In this sense, (1+gt) 1 is the \real" growth rate of the capabilities of the potential challenger,
taking into account of the discount factor.
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2.2 Dynamic Game
For the dynamic game, we need to consider the continuation payos in addition to the
stage payos. As in table 1, there are four possible outcomes in period t: Status Quo,
War, Single Hegemony, and Peaceful Transit. If the status quo continues, the expected
discounted payo for the potential challenger is s + UCt+1(yt+1), where U
C
t+1(yt+1) is
its continuation payo for the potential challenger in period t + 1. Meanwhile, the
expected discounted payo for the hegemony is 1 + UHt+1(yt+1), where U
H
t+1(yt+1) is
its continuation payo in period t+ 1. If there is a war, the loser is out of the game
and the winner becomes the single hegemony, who enjoys the periodic hegemonic
bonus. Therefore, if there is a war in period t, the expected discounted payo for
the potential challenger and the hegemon is
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. Instead, if the
hegemon preempts and the potential challenger capitulates, the hegemon becomes
the single hegemon without a war, whereas the potential challenger is out of the
game. The expected discounted payo for the potential challenger and the hegemon
is
 
0; 1
1 

.3 If peaceful transit occurs, the hegemon and the potential challenger
exchange their seats. The potential challenger becomes the hegemony and enjoys the
hegemonic bonus. Its expected discounted payo is 1+V Ct+1(yt+1), where V
C
t+1(yt+1) is
its continuation payo in period t+1. Meanwhile, the hegemony loses the hegemonic
bonus, but still enjoys the benet share of the follower, s. Its expected discounted
payo is s+ V Ht+1(yt+1), where V
H
t+1(yt+1) is its continuation payo in period t+ 1.
Table 2: Expected Discounted Payos in Period t
Outcomes
Expected Discounted Payos for the
Potential Challenger and Hegemon
Status Quo

s+ UCt+1(yt+1); 1 + U
H
t+1(yt+1)

War

p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

Single Hegemony

0; 1
1 

Peaceful Transit

1 + V Ct+1(yt+1); s+ V
H
t+1(yt+1)

Our solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). The follow-
ing lemma shows the condition of peaceful transit.
Lemma 1 There exists a critical period T , such that p(yT+1) > 1   s and p(yT ) 
1 s. If the status quo continues through period T , peaceful transit will occur in period
T + 1. Any challenging will be resisted by the hegemon before period T + 1.
3As p(yt)  0, p(yt) 11   0. If the hegemon preempts, the dominant strategy for the potential
challenger is to resist. That is, if the hegemon preempts, war begins.
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Intuitively, the capabilities of the potential challenger is growing at a positive rate
over time, relative to the capabilities of the hegemon. If the hegemony capitulates
in some period, it will capitulate thereafter and the subsequent continuation payo
for the hegemon will be s
1  . If the potential challenger challenges in period t, the
hegemon must decide whether to resist or capitulate and the corresponding expected
discounted payos are: (1  p(yt)) 11  and s+ V Ht+1(yt+1) = s+  s1  = s1  . Clearly,
if p(yt) > 1   s, the hegemon will capitulate if the potential challenger challenges,
otherwise resist. Therefore, there exists a critical period T , such that p(yT+1) > 1  s
and p(yT )  1  s. If the status quo continues through period T , peaceful transit will
occur in period T +1. Any challenging will be resisted by the hegemon before period
T + 1. Notice that yT < y.
The following proposition shows the existence of a unique Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE), in which at any give period t  T , if yt is large, the potential
challenger challenges; if yt is small, the hegemon preempts; if yt is in the middle, they
end up with the status quo and the game continues to the next period.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
with a recursive structure. Specically, depending on the future scenario, 8t  T ,
there are T   t+ 1 possible cases.
For case i = 1; :::; T t, if the status quo stands in period t and the game continues
to period t+1, the status quo continues from period t+1 to period t+i 1 and then war
occurs in period t+i. If p(yt) ip(yt+i)  s(1 i), the potential challenger challenges
and the hegemon resists; if 0  p(yt)  ip(yt+i) < s(1  i), the potential challenger
does not challenge and the hegemon stays with the status quo; if p(yt)  ip(yt+i) < 0,
the potential challenger does not challenge and the hegemon preempts.
For case i = T   t+1, if the status quo stands in period t and the game continues
to period t+1, the status quo continues from period t+1 to period t+ i  1 = T and
then peaceful transit occurs in period t+i = T+1. If p(yt)  s+i(1 s), the potential
challenger challenges and the hegemon resists; if i(1   s)  p(yt) < s + i(1   s),
the potential challenger does not challenge and the hegemon stays with the status quo;
if p(yt) < 
i(1   s), the potential challenger does not challenge and the hegemon
preempts.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, from Lemma 1, if the status quo continues through period T , peaceful
transit will occur in period T + 1. Any challenging will be resisted by the hegemon
before period T + 1. Backward to period T , both the potential challenger and the
hegemon know that peaceful transit will occur in period T + 1, if the status quo
stands in period T and the game continues. There are three possible scenarios: if yT
is large, the potential challenger challenges; if yT is small, the hegemon preempts; if
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yT is in the middle, they end up with the status quo and the game continues to the
next period T + 1 and peaceful transit occurs.
Backward to period T   1, both the potential challenger and the hegemon know
that if the status quo stands in period T 1 and the game continues to period T , there
are two possible cases: case 1, war occurs in period T (either the potential challenger
challenges or the hegemon preempts); case 2, the status quo stands in period T and
then peaceful transit occurs in period T + 1. Again, in each of the two cases, there
are three possible scenarios: if yT 1 is large, the potential challenger challenges; if
yT 1 is small, the hegemon preempts; if yT 1 is in the middle, they end up with the
status quo and the game continues to the next period T .
... ...
Continuing backward to any arbitrary period t  T , both the potential challenger
and the hegemon know that if the status quo stands in period t and the game continues
to period t+1, there are T   t+1 possible cases: case i = 1; :::; T   t, the status quo
continues from period t+1 to period t+ i 1 and then war occurs in period t+ i; case
i = T t+1, the status quo continues from period t+1 to period t+i 1 = T and then
peaceful transit occurs in period t+ i = T + 1. Again, in each of the T   t+ 1 cases,
there are three possible scenarios: if yt 1 is large, the potential challenger challenges;
if yt 1 is small, the hegemon preempts; if yt 1 is in the middle, they end up with the
status quo and the game continues to the next period t+ 1.
2.3 Equilibrium Characterization
Now, we turn to further characterize the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) specied in proposition 1. The following lemma shows that p(yt)  p(yt+1)
is decreasing in yt if yt+1 is in the \taking-o" stage, whereas p(yt)   p(yt+1) is
increasing in yt if yt is in the \surpassing" stage.
Lemma 2 p(yt) p(yt+1) is decreasing in yt if yt+1 = (1+gt)yt  ey; p(yt) p(yt+1)
is increasing in yt if yt > ey.
Proof. Taking the derivative of p(yt)  p(yt+1) with respect to yt,
d [p(yt)  p(yt+1)]
dyt
= p0(yt)  (1 + gt)p0(yt+1)
If yt+1 is in the \taking-o" stage, the winning function of the potential challenger
is convex, p0(yt)  p0(yt+1); meanwhile, (1 + gt) > 1. Therefore, the term in the
equation above will be less than zero and p(yt)  p(yt+1) is decreasing in yt.
If yt is in the \surpassing" stage, the winning function of the potential challenger
is concave, p0(yt)  p0(yt+1); meanwhile, (1 + gt)  1. Therefore, the term in the
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equation above will be greater than or equal to zero and p(yt)  p(yt+1) is increasing
in yt.
By proposition 1, the lemma above implies that in the \taking-o" stage, the
potential challenger is less likely to challenge and the hegemon is more likely to
preempt as time goes by with yt growing; in the \surpassing" stage, the potential
challenger is more likely to challenge and the hegemon is less likely to preempt as
time goes by with yt growing. Consequently, we have the following proposition, which
shows that the hegemon is willing to wait till to some optimal point to preempt
before the turning point, or will never preempt after the turning point; the potential
challenger will either challenge immediately, wait till to some optimal point after the
turning point to challenge, or wait till to period T + 1 for the peaceful transit.
Proposition 2 There exists a y0  ey, such that
y0 =

yi if p(yi 1)  p(yi)  0 and p(yi)  p(yi+1) < 0ey if p(yi)  p(yi+1)  0 8yi  ey
The hegemon will never preempt for yt < y
0 or yt > ey.
There exists a y00  ey, such that
y00 =

yi if p(yi 1)  p(yi)  s(1  ) and p(yi)  p(yi+1) < s(1  )
yT if p(yi)  p(yi+1) < s(1  ) 8yi  yT
The potential challenger will never challenge in between yt and y
00, for yt < y00.
Proof. By the one-shot deviation principle, consider the hegemon's decision to
preempt in the current period t or the next period t+1. If preempting in the current
period t, the expected discounted payo is (1   p(yt)) 11  , whereas if preempting in
the next period t+1, the expected discounted payo is 1+(1 p(yt+1)) 11  , provided
that the status quo stands in period t and the game continues to period t+1. Clearly,
if p(yt)   p(yt+1)  0, the hegemon will wait; otherwise, the hegemon will preempt
in period t instead of t + 1. By Lemma 2, p(yt)   p(yt+1) is decreasing in yt if yt+1
is in the \taking-o" stage, whereas p(yt)  p(yt+1) is increasing in yt if yt is in the
\surpassing" stage. Therefore, we may nd some yi  ey, such that p(yi 1) p(yi)  0
and p(yi) p(yi+1) < 0. The hegemon is willing to wait till to yi to preempt. Instead,
if p(yi)   p(yi+1)  0, 8yi  ey, the hegemon will not preempt in the \taking-o"
stage. It will not preempt in the \surpassing" stage either, as p(yt)   p(yt+1) is
increasing in yt in the \surpassing" stage.
Similarly, consider the potential challenger's decision to challenge in the current
period t or the next period t+ 1. If challenging in the current period t, the expected
discounted payo is p(yt)
1
1  , whereas if challenging in the next period t + 1, the
expected discounted payo is s+ p(yt+1)
1
1  , provided that the status quo stands in
8
period t and the game continues to period t+1. Clearly, if p(yt) p(yt+1)  s(1 ),
the potential challenger will challenge in period t instead of t + 1; otherwise, the
potential challenger will wait till period t + 1 to challenge. By Lemma 2, p(yt)  
p(yt+1) is decreasing in yt if yt+1 is in the \taking-o" stage, whereas p(yt) p(yt+1)
is increasing in yt if yt is in the \surpassing" stage. Therefore, we may nd some
yi  ey, such that p(yi 1)   p(yi)  s(1   ) and p(yi)   p(yi+1) < s(1   ). If the
potential challenger does not challenge in the current period t, it wait till to yi to
challenge. Instead, if p(yi)   p(yi+1) < s(1   ), 8yi  yT , the potential challenger
will wait till to period T + 1 for the peaceful transit.
The typical equilibrium is illustrated in gure 2. If in the current period t, yt < y
0,
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Figure 2: The Typical Equilibrium
the hegemon will wait and the potential challenger will not challenge and the status
quo stands; if y0  yt < ey, the hegemon will preempt immediately and war occurs;
if ey  yt < y00, the hegemon will not preempt and the potential challenger will not
challenge and the status quo stands; if y00  yt < yT , the potential challenger will
challenge immediately and war occurs; if yt  yT , the hegemon will challenger and
peaceful transit occurs.
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3 Dual Boiling Frog Eects
The following corollary says that as  increases, the hegemon is willing to preempt
earlier at a lower lever of the capabilities of the potential challenger. But it is uncer-
tainty whether the potential challenger is willing to challenge earlier or later.
Corollary 1 y0 is an decreasing function of .
Clearly, as  increases, p(yt) p(yt+1) decreases. From proposition 2, it is easy to
see that y0 is decreasing. However, as  increases, s(1  ) decreases too. Therefore,
we cannot decide if y00 is increasing or decreasing.
Further, the following corollary says that if the potential challenger grows on a
faster path, then the hegemon is willing to preempt at a lower lever of the capabilities
of the potential challenger, while the potential challenger is willing to challenge at a
higher lever of its capabilities.
Corollary 2 If the potential challenge grows on a faster path, y0 is decreasing while
y00 is increasing.
Clearly, if gt increases, p(yt)   p(yt+1) decreases. From proposition 2, it is easy
to see that y0 is decreasing and y00 is increasing.
By the corollaries above, we could have some variations of the typical equilibrium
as described in proposition 2. For instance, as  goes to zero, the potential challenger
may have incentive to challenge immediately, even though yt is small. At the other
extreme, as  goes to one, y0 goes to y and the hegemon will preempt immediately.
Further, if  and growth rate are in some middle range, such that y0 = ey and y00 = yT ,
the hegemon will not preempt and the potential challenger will not challenge and the
status quo continues through period T and peaceful transit occurs in period T+1. We
call this Dual Boiling Frog Eects, which is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The dual boiling frog eects occurring in the middle range of capa-
bility catching-up rate prevent a dominant state from preempting and a rising state
from challenging the other side.
4 Expectation Divergence
Following the literature of behavior economics, suppose the hegemon and the potential
challenger hold dierent views of the growth path of the potential challenger, about
which they \agree to disagree." Simply because they are overcondent about the
precision of their private information.
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The following proposition shows that divergent expectations for favorable compar-
ative growth advantage motivate both parties to keep the status quo. The hegemon
and the potential challenger could end up with the following situation: to the point
view of the potential challenger, the hegemon should have preempted earlier, while
the hegemon does not, provided that by is small.
Proposition 4 Suppose the potential challenger is optimistic and believes its capa-
bilities will grow along fgtg, where gt > 0 for all t, while the hegemon believes that the
growth of the potential challenger's capabilities will be halted eventually and remain
stagnant at some level by.
If p(by) < s, we have the following equilibrium: the potential challenger does not
challenge and the hegemon does not preempt, and the status quo continues till to by.
Proof. Consider the case that the growth of the potential challenger's capabili-
ties is halted eventually and remain stagnant at some level by. As there is no further
growth, the best response for the potential challenger will be challenge immediately
or never thereafter. If the potential challenger challenges immediately, the hegemon
will decide whether to resist or capitulate. In the former case, the corresponding
expected discounted payos are:
 
p(by) 1
1  ; (1  p(by)) 11 . In the latter case, peace-
ful transit occurs and the corresponding expected discounted payos are:
 
1
1  ;
s
1 

.
If the hegemon preempts immediately, the corresponding expected discounted pay-
os are:
 
p(by) 1
1  ; (1  p(by)) 11 . If both the hegemon and the potential challenger
keep the status quo, the status quo continues forever and the corresponding expected
discounted payos are:
 
s
1  ;
1
1 

. Clearly, the hegemon will never preempt. De-
pending on by, there are three possible cases: if p(by) < s, both the hegemon and
the potential challenger keep the status quo and the status quo continues forever; if
s  p(by) < 1   s, the potential challenger challenges immediately, the hegemon re-
sists, and war occurs; if p(by)  1 s, the potential challenger challenges immediately,
the hegemon capitulates, and peaceful transit occurs.
If the hegemon believes that the growth of the potential challenger's capabilities
will be halted eventually and remain stagnant at by and p(by) < s, by the result above,
it will never preempt. In contrast, if the potential challenger is optimistic and believes
its capabilities will grow along fgtg, where gt > 0 for all t, by proposition 2, it will
either challenge immediately or wait till to y00. Note, p(y00)  p(ey)  1=2  s >
p(by). Therefore, if the potential challenger does not challenge immediately, it will not
challenge till by.
In addition, if y0 < by, the hegemon and the potential challenger could end up with
the situation: to the point view of the potential challenger, the hegemon should have
preempted earlier, while the hegemon does not, provided that by < s.
The implication is that due to \agree to disagree", the status quo could continue
till to the point of \agree to disagree" is solved. At that point, if the potential
11
challenger's capabilities continues growing along fgtg, where gt > 0 for all t, the
hegemon may preempt immediately, even though it should have preempt earlier if
it knew the sustained growth of its opponent. Instead, if indeed the growth of the
potential challenger's capabilities is halted eventually and remains stagnant at by < s,
the hegemon will become the single hegemony and enjoy the periodic hegemonic
bonus. The potential challenger will be out of the game as there is no way for it to
catch up with the hegemon.
5 Relative Advantage Deterioration
Consider the case of more than one potential challenger (rising state). The story
will be totally changed, as the winner of the power transition still needs to face the
new emerging \#2". Since the winner suers the capabilities loss due to the war, the
winner may even at a worse situation than staying with the status quo. Consequently,
it is the third party that benets from the tussle with the third-party impediment.
The following proposition shows that with the concerns of relative advantage de-
terioration over a third party in the new power structure after even a successful war,
both the hegemon and the potential challenger are less willing to star a war and the
status quo are therefore more likely to be maintained.
Proposition 5 Suppose there exists a third player with the capabilities zt < yt at
period t, which is growing over time at rate g0t  gt > 0 in period t. Compared to
case without the third player, the hegemon is less likely to preempt and the potential
challenger is less likely to challenge in period t.
Proof. By the one-shot deviation principle, consider the hegemon's decision to
preempt in the current period t or not. If preempting in the current period t, the
expected discounted payo is (1   p(yt))
h
1 + UHt+1

zt+1
1 D(yt)
i
, whereas if not pre-
empting in the current period t, the expected discounted payo is

1 + UHt+1(yt+1)

,
provided that the status quo stands in period t and the game continues to period t+1.4
From section 2, UHt+1() is a decreasing function. Clearly, (1 p(yt))
h
1 + UHt+1

zt+1
1 D(yt)
i
 
1 + UHt+1(yt+1)

is decreasing in zt+1,
5 which implies that the hegemon is less likely
to preempt in period t as zt+1 increases.
4With a slight abuse of notation, we still use UHt+1() to denote the continuation payo in period
t + 1 for the hegemon, even with the third player. The existence of the third player is kind of
\second-order eect", which is eective only when it becomes the new emerging \#2" after a war
between the hegemon and the potential challenger.
5In particular, for 0  zt+1  (1 D(yt))y, UHt+1

zt+1
1 D(yt)

is constant at its upper bound 11  .
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Similarly, by the one-shot deviation principle, consider the potential challenger's
decision to challenge in the current period t or not. If challenging in the current period
t, the expected discounted payo is p(yt)
h
1 + UHt+1

zt+1
yt D(1=yt)
i
, whereas if not chal-
lenging in the current period t, the expected discounted payo is

s+ UCt+1(yt+1)

,
provided that the status quo stands in period t and the game continues to period t+1.
From section 2, UHt+1() is a decreasing function. Clearly, p(yt)
h
1 + UHt+1

zt+1
yt D(1=yt)
i
 
s+ UCt+1(yt+1)

is decreasing in zt+1,
6 which implies that the potential challenger is
less likely to challenge in period t as zt+1 increases.
6 Conclusion
We present a prospect theory model to explain why power transitions do not neces-
sarily lead to war. The potential challenger (rising state) appears to be surpassing
the hegemon (declining state) in capabilities. The potential challenger must decide
whether to test its growing capabilities, and the hegemon must decide whether to
resist a challenge or preempt to eliminate the potential challenger. We show the
existence of a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), in which at any
given period, if the capabilities of the potential challenger is large, the potential chal-
lenger challenges; if the capabilities of the potential challenger is small, the hegemon
preempts; if the capabilities of the potential challenger is in the middle, they end up
with the status quo.
We nd that three major mechanisms prevent the occurrence of potential power
transition wars. First, the dual boiling frog eects occurring in the middle range of
capability catching-up rate prevent a dominant state from preempting and a rising
state from challenging the other side. Second, divergent expectations for favorable
comparative growth advantage, about which they \agree to disagree", motivate both
parties to keep the status quo. Third, the concerns of relative advantage deterioration
over a third party in the new power structure after even a successful war also deter
both parties from starting a war. Simply because, with the third-party impediment,
the winner suers the capabilities loss due to the war, and may even at a worse
situation when facing the new emerging \#2" than staying with the status quo.
Consequently, it is the third party that benets from the tussle.
6In particular, for 0  zt+1  (yt  D(1=yt))y, UHt+1

zt+1
yt D(1=yt)

is constant at its upper bound
1
1  .
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, if the status quo continues through period T , peaceful transit will
occur in period T +1. Any challenging will be resisted by the hegemon before period
T + 1.
Backward to period T , both the potential challenger and the hegemon know that
peaceful transit will occur in period T+1, if the status quo stands in period T and the
game continues. Therefore, the continuation payo in period T + 1 for the potential
challenger V CT+1(yT+1) =
1
1  ; the continuation payo in period T +1 for the hegemon
V HT+1(yT+1) =
s
1  .
If the hegemon preempts in period T , war begins and the corresponding ex-
pected discounted payos are:
 
p(yT )
1
1  ; (1  p(yT )) 11 

. If the potential challenger
challenges in period T , the hegemon resists and the corresponding expected dis-
counted payos are:
 
p(yT )
1
1  ; (1  p(yT )) 11 

. If the hegemon and the potential
challenger keep the status quo, the corresponding expected discounted payos are: 
s+  1
1  ; 1 + 
s
1 

. Therefore, if p(yT )  s+ (1  s), the potential challenger chal-
lenges and the hegemon resists; if (1  s)  p(yT ) < s+ (1  s), both the hegemon
and the potential challenger stay with the status quo; if p(yT ) < (1 s), the hegemon
preempts.
Backward to period T   1, both the potential challenger and the hegemon know
that if the status quo stands in period T   1 and the game continues to period T ,
there are two possible cases: case 1, war occurs in period T ; case 2, the status quo
stands in period T and then peaceful transit occurs in period T + 1.
In case 1, the continuation payos in period T for the potential challenger and
the hegemon are UCT (yT ) = p(yT )
1
1  and U
H
T (yT ) = (1   p(yT )) 11  respectively. If
the hegemon preempts in period T   1, war begins and the corresponding expected
discounted payos are:
 
p(yT 1) 11  ; (1  p(yT 1)) 11 

. If the potential challenger
challenges in period T   1, the hegemon resists and the corresponding expected dis-
counted payos are:
 
p(yT 1) 11  ; (1  p(yT 1)) 11 

. If the hegemon and the potential
challenger keep the status quo, the corresponding expected discounted payos are: 
s+ p(yT )
1
1  ; 1 + (1  p(yT )) 11 

. Therefore, if p(yT 1)   p(yT )  s(1   ), the
potential challenger challenges and the hegemon resists; if 0  p(yT 1)   p(yT ) <
s(1  ), both the hegemon and the potential challenger stay with the status quo; if
p(yT 1)  p(yT ) < 0, the hegemon preempts.
In case 2, the continuation payos in period T for the potential challenger and
the hegemon are UCT (yT ) = s + 
1
1  and U
H
T (yT ) = 1 + 
s
1  respectively. If the
hegemon preempts in period T   1, war begins and the corresponding expected
discounted payos are:
 
p(yT 1) 11  ; (1  p(yT 1)) 11 

. If the potential challenger
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challenges in period T   1, the hegemon resists and the corresponding expected dis-
counted payos are:
 
p(yT 1) 11  ; (1  p(yT 1)) 11 

. If the hegemon and the potential
challenger keep the status quo, the corresponding expected discounted payos are: 
s+ (s+  1
1  ); 1 + (1 + 
s
1  )

. Therefore, if p(yT 1)  s+2(1 s), the potential
challenger challenges and the hegemon resists; if 2(1  s)  p(yT 1) < s+ 2(1  s),
both the hegemon and the potential challenger stay with the status quo; if p(yT 1) <
2(1  s), the hegemon preempts.
... ...
Continuing backward to any arbitrary period t  T , both the potential challenger
and the hegemon know that if the status quo stands in period t and the game continues
to period t+1, there are T   t+1 possible cases: case i = 1; :::; T   t, the status quo
continues from period t + 1 to period t + i   1 and then war occurs in period t + i;
case i = T   t+1, the status quo continues from period t+1 to period t+ i  1 = T
and then peaceful transit occurs in period t+ i = T + 1.
For case i = 1, the continuation payos in period t+1 for the potential challenger
and the hegemon are UCt+1(yt+1) = p(yt+1)
1
1  and U
H
t+1(yt+1) = (1   p(yt+1)) 11  re-
spectively. If the hegemon preempts in period t, war begins and the corresponding
expected discounted payos are:
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. If the potential chal-
lenger challenges in period t, the hegemon resists and the corresponding expected
discounted payos are:
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. If the hegemon and the potential
challenger keep the status quo, the corresponding expected discounted payos are: 
s+ p(yt+1)
1
1  ; 1 + (1  p(yt+1)) 11 

. Therefore, if p(yt)  p(yt+1)  s(1  ), the
potential challenger challenges and the hegemon resists; if 0  p(yt)   p(yt+1) <
s(1  ), both the hegemon and the potential challenger stay with the status quo; if
p(yt)  p(yt+1) < 0, the hegemon preempts.
For case i = 2; :::; T   t, the continuation payos in period t + 1 for the po-
tential challenger and the hegemon are UCt+1(yt+1) =
iX
j=2
j 2s + i 1p(yt+i)
1
1  
and UHt+1(yt+1) =
iX
j=2
j 2 + i 1(1   p(yt+i)) 1
1   respectively. If the hege-
mon preempts in period t, war begins and the corresponding expected discounted
payos are:
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. If the potential challenger challenges in
period t, the hegemon resists and the corresponding expected discounted pay-
os are:
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. If the hegemon and the potential chal-
lenger keep the status quo, the corresponding expected discounted payos are:0@s+ 
0@ iX
j=2
j 2s+ i 1p(yt+i)
1
1  
1A ; 1 + 
0@ iX
j=2
j 2 + i 1(1  p(yt+i)) 1
1  
1A1A. Therefore, if p(yt) 
ip(yt+i)  s(1   i), the potential challenger challenges and the hegemon resists; if
0  p(yt)  ip(yt+i) < s(1  i), both the hegemon and the potential challenger stay
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with the status quo; if p(yt)  ip(yt+i) < 0, the hegemon preempts.
For case i = T   t + 1, the continuation payos in period t + 1 for the potential
challenger and the hegemon are UCt+1(yt+1) =
T t+1X
j=2
j 2s+T t
1
1   and U
H
t+1(yt+1) =
T t+1X
j=2
j 2 + T t
s
1   respectively. If the hegemon preempts in period t, war begins
and the corresponding expected discounted payos are:
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. If
the potential challenger challenges in period t, the hegemon resists and the corre-
sponding expected discounted payos are:
 
p(yt)
1
1  ; (1  p(yt)) 11 

. If the hegemon
and the potential challenger keep the status quo, the corresponding expected dis-
counted payos are:
0@s+ 
0@T t+1X
j=2
j 2s+ T t
1
1  
1A ; 1 + 
0@T t+1X
j=2
j 2 + T t
s
1  
1A1A.
Therefore, if p(yt)  s + T t+1(1   s), the potential challenger challenges and the
hegemon resists; if T t+1(1   s)  p(yt) < s + T t+1(1   s), both the hegemon
and the potential challenger stay with the status quo; if p(yt) < 
T t+1(1   s), the
hegemon preempts.
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